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ABSTRACT
Global e-commerce sales have reached over $1 trillion and e-commerce has experienced unprecedented prosper for the past
years. Along with this remarkable growth is the emergence of giant online retailers such as Amazon.com in the U.S. and JD.com
in China. Traditionally these retailers adopt merchant revenue model under which they buy products from suppliers and resell to
consumers. Over years, the leading online retailers have developed a considerable consumer base. With the options of reaping
their dominance via their merchant revenue model, interestingly, these retailers open their platforms and allow third-party sellers
to sell on their platforms, thus inviting competition. Small merchants might use the platforms to reach customers who otherwise
would not know the existence of the merchants, and are attracted to the retailers' platforms by the promise of tapping into their
huge user base. Third-party sellers report an average of 50% increase in sales when they join Amazon's platform. In turn,
Amazon takes a commission for every sale (e.g., 6% for personal computers and 15% for mobile phones). Intuitively, both the
retailer and the third-party sellers benefit from the partnership if the third-party sellers sell products different from those offered
by the retailer. However, one puzzling phenomenon is that these retailers allow third-party sellers to sell identical products as
those offered by the retailers, and we often observe both a retailer and a third-party seller offering the same product on the
retailer's platform.
More interestingly, many third-party sellers have their own websites and carry more products than retailers in some specific
category, and when they join a retailer's platform they sell some of their products on the retailer's platform. Sometimes these
third-party sellers may even choose to sell the same product as the retailer, instead of different products, on the retailer's platform.
For example, www.HANDU.com sells clothing for women, men, and kids on its own website, but only sells women dress on
JD.com. Conceivably, the sellers do so because the presence of sellers on a retailer's platform can increase the traffic to the
sellers' websites: When a product by a third-party seller is listed on a retailer's platform and is exposed to its consumers, some of
the consumers may also become aware of the other products offered by the seller, with the help of different online tools such as
search engines. We call this cross-product awareness increase spillover effect of consumer awareness.
This paper aims to answer the following questions. With an open platform and a given commission rate, how does the spillover
effect affect a third-party seller’s incentive to join a retailer’s platform and how does the spillover effect affect its product
offering on the platform? We develop a game-theoretic model in which the platform is open and the commission rate is given,
and the third-party seller carries identical products as the retailer as well as exclusive products that the retailer does not carry. The
third party chooses whether to join the platform; If so, the third party chooses which product(s), the identical product, the
exclusive product, or both products, is/are sold on the retailer’s platform.
We find that the third party's optimal selling strategies vary with its initial awareness, the extent of spillover effect, and the
commission rate. Specifically, for a low commission rate, when its initial awareness and spillover effect are mild, the third party
sells both identical and exclusive products on the retailer's platform; when its initial awareness is high or spillover effect is salient,
the third party sells exclusive products only. For a high commission rate, the third party only sells identical products if the
spillover effect relative to initial awareness is significant; otherwise, the third party does not offer any product.
In particular, even when the commission rate is very high, the third party may still have incentive to sell the identical product on
the retailer's platform. For instance, when the spillover effect relative to the initial awareness level is significant, even the retailer
asks for the whole revenue of third party's sales on the retailer's platform, the third party still optimally chooses to sell the
identical product on the retailer's platform. This surprising result is because in this case the spillover effect is more important than
the initial awareness, the benefit of increased demand for exclusive product resulting from spillover effect outweighs the cost of
contributing the revenue from the identical product to the retailer.
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